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ABSTRACT
The high and rising household savings rate in China is not easily reconciled with the traditional explanations
that emphasize life cycle factors, the precautionary saving motive, financial development, or habit
formation. This paper proposes a new competitive saving motive: As the sex ratio rises, Chinese parents
with a son raise their savings in a competitive manner in order to improve their son's relative attractiveness
for marriage. The pressure on savings spills over to other households. Both cross-regional and household-level
evidence supports this hypothesis. This factor can potentially account for about half of the actual increase
in the household savings rate during 1990-2007.
Shang-Jin Wei








International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, NW





High savings rates in certain countries are said to be a major contributor to the recent 
housing price bubbles and the global financial crisis by depressing global long-term interest rates 
in the last decade (Greenspan, 2009). The Chinese national savings rate, at about 50 percent of 
GDP in 2007, has caught special attention. The household savings is close to half of the national 
savings. The household savings as a share of the disposal income nearly doubled from 16% in 
1990 to 30% in 2007. 
The purpose of this paper is to test a new hypothesis regarding household savings 
behavior using Chinese household and regional data. Before doing that, we note that there is no 
shortage of theories of savings behavior in the literature. First, the life cycle theory (Modigliani, 
1970, and Modigliani and Cao, 2004) predicts that the savings rate rises with the share of 
working age population in the total population. This explanation doesn’t appear to be consistent 
with the profile of savings at the household level (Chamon and Prasad, 2010). The second 
explanation has to do with a precautionary savings motive in combination with a rise in income 
uncertainty, which is favored by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) and Chamon and Prasad (2008). 
The problem is that while both pension systems and the public provision of health care in China 
have been improving since 2003, household savings as a share of disposable income continued to 
rise sharply during the same period. This time series pattern contradicts the precautionary motive 
theory. The third explanation is a low level of financial development. This has the same 
difficulty as the last explanation since the financial system is most likely more efficient today 
than a few years ago yet the savings rate still rose. The fourth explanation is cultural norms. But 
cultural norms tend to be persistent, and therefore are unlikely to be capable of explaining the 
visible rise in the savings rate over the last two decades
1.  
                                                 
1 We do not study corporate savings behavior in this paper. The Chinese corporate savings rate has risen sharply in recent years 
(Kuijs, 2006), and is a separate puzzle to be explained. The existing explanation suggests that a combination of state ownership 
and windfalls in resource sectors is the primary driver. (The government savings rate is relatively moderate and has turned 
negative in 2008-09.) We note, however, that a recent paper by Bayoumi, Tong and Wei (2009) discusses China’s corporate 
savings rate in a global context and casts doubt on the usual interpretation. Because corporate savings rates have been rising 
globally (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2005; and IMF, 2005), it turns out that the Chinese corporate savings rate is only modestly 
higher than those of other countries (by 2 percentage points above the global average). So differences in corporate savings are 
unlikely to be a big part of the cross country differences in national savings rates. Moreover, comparing corporate savings by 3 
 
In this paper, we suggest that an alternative saving motive may be at work: People save in 
order to improve their relative standing in the marriage market. When the sex ratio (the number 
of men per woman in the pre-marital cohort) rises, families with sons compete with each other to 
raise their savings rate in response to ever rising pressure in the marriage market. Families with 
daughters may not decrease their savings due to existence of two offsetting motives. On one 
hand, they are tempted to reduce their savings in order to take advantage of the higher savings 
rates of their future sons-in-law. On the other hand, they wish to avoid erosion of bargaining 
power by their daughters in their marriages if the relative wealth level of the husband and wife 
affect their relative bargaining power within a family. These two effects go in opposite directions. 
In addition, households without a son may also be induced to save more if the competition 
among families with a son bids up the prices of housing.  
The increased pressure in the marriage market comes from China’s rising sex ratio 
imbalance, which has made it progressively more difficult for men to get married. As far as we 
know, we are the first in the literature to propose this hypothesis as an explanation for a rising 
savings rate in China. Toward the end of the paper, we argue that the explanation is likely 
applicable to many other countries as well.  
  We provide a series of evidence. First, we examine household-level data that cover 122 
rural counties and 70 cities. While households with a son typically save more than households 
with a daughter, we do not regard this per se as supportive evidence of our hypothesis, since 
other channels could account for this difference. Instead, the evidence that we find compelling is 
that savings by otherwise identical households with a son tend to be greater in regions with a 
higher local sex ratio. This is something clearly predicted by our hypothesis, but not directly by 
any other existing explanations. In addition, we find that savings by households with a daughter 
do not decline in regions with a high sex ratio, which is consistent with our interpretation that 
there are offsetting incentives on savings faced by households with a daughter.  
Second, across provinces, we show that the local savings rate tends to be higher in 
regions and years in which the local sex ratio (for the pre-marital age cohort) is higher. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chinese firms of different ownership, in resource and non-resource sectors, Bayoumi, Tong and Wei (2009) do not find evidence 
that state-owned firms save more than private firms, or that the corporate savings rate is unusually high in resource sectors.  4 
 
continues to be true after we control for local income, social safety net, the age profile of the 
local population, and province and year fixed effects. 
Third, in recognition of possible endogeneity of and measurement error in local sex ratios, 
we employ instrumental variables where the local sex ratio for the pre-marital age cohort is 
shown to be linked to local financial penalties for violating family planning policies set more 
than a decade earlier (as Ebenstein, 2008, and Edlund et al., 2008, also document). With two-
stage least squares estimation, the effect of local sex ratios on local savings rates remain positive 
and statistically significant. In fact, the point estimate becomes larger. This suggests that an 
increase in the sex ratio causes a rise in the savings rate. By our estimation, the sex ratio effect 
can explain more than half of the actual rise in the household savings rate from 1990 to 2007. 
Because the sex ratio imbalance at birth has been increasing steadily since the mid-1980s, 
the imbalance for the pre-marital age cohort will almost surely be higher over the next decade 
than in the last decade, even if the sex ratio at birth starts to be reserved soon. This implies that 
the incremental savings rate that is stimulated by the competitive savings motive will almost 
surely rise in importance in the near future. 
A theoretical model (Du and Wei, 2010) that has been developed as a result of the current 
paper suggests that the competitive savings triggered by a rise in the sex ratio can produce a 
significant amount of current account imbalances. Once one recognizes that the sex ratio 
imbalance is a structural factor behind a rising savings rate, it should be clear that a discussion of 
global imbalances that focuses narrowly on exchange rates or even social safety nets is 
incomplete. Furthermore, policy actions that improve the economic status of women could 
potentially reduce the sex ratio imbalance by reducing parental preference for sons (Qian, 2008). 
A relaxation of family planning policy could also reduce the imbalance. Because of their 
important implications for aggregate savings and current account imbalances, these changes 
deserve more attention than they receive now. 
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, we provide statistical evidence for our hypothesis. Finally, in Section 4, 
we conclude and discuss possible future research. A data appendix explains the sources and 
definitions of the main variables. 5 
 
2. Review of the Existing Literature 
 
A relevant literature is the work on status goods and social norms (e.g., Cole, Mailath and 
Postlewaite, 1992; Hopkins, 2009; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 and 2009). When allowing 
certain goods to offer utility beyond their direct consumption value (i.e., through “status,” which 
in turn could affect the prospect of finding a marriage partner), it is easy to show that 
consumption and savings behavior can be altered. However, none of these papers formally 
features a sex ratio imbalance. The imbalance leads to non-trivial general equilibrium questions. 
In particular, while men may react to a rise in the sex ratio by raising their savings rate, could the 
women do the reverse to take advantage of the higher savings of their future husbands? In 
addition, could men (or their parents) compete by increasing their conspicuous consumption as a 
signal of their attractiveness?  This could result in a decline in the savings rate. On the other hand, 
while conspicuous consumption may increase the frequency of dating, the probability of securing 
a marriage partner may depend more on showing substantial wealth than on showing off a few 
flashy goods. Given the ambiguity, it is an open empirical question as to whether savings rates 
are positively or negatively related to sex ratio imbalances.  
Another relevant literature is the economics of family. Several papers have explored the 
effects of a sex ratio imbalance on marriage prospect by gender and (female) labor market 
participation (e.g., Angrist, 2002; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002). One interesting finding 
that is particularly relevant for this paper is that higher sex ratios (more men than women) tend to 
increase female bargaining power in the marriage market and within households. Siow (1998) 
studies the consequences of relative shortage of fecund women in the marriage market for gender 
roles. However, these papers do not study directly the implications for aggregate savings. 
 
A General Equilibrium Model of Savings That Features an Unbalanced Sex Ratio 
The model in Du and Wei (2010), developed concurrently with this paper, is the only one 
that we are aware of that studies the effect of a rise in the sex ratio on the aggregate savings rate 
in general equilibrium. They consider an overlapping generations (OLG) model with two sexes 
and a desire to marry. Everyone lives two periods. She/he works and saves in the first period. 6 
 
Marriage can take place only at the beginning of the second period, and only between men and 
women in the same cohort. All men (and women) are identical ex ante. 
There are two benefits associated with marriage. First, a couple can pool their savings, 
and their consumption has a partial public good feature (e.g., the same car and furniture can be 
used by both). In other words, the sum of the husband’s and the wife’s consumption can be more 
than their combined wealth. Second, in a marriage, one obtains emotional utility (or “love”) from 
his/her partner. “Love,” or the amount of emotional utility any person can offer to his/her spouse, 
is a random variable in the first period; only its distribution is known. It becomes public 
information once one enters the marriage market in the second period. Everyone ranks members 
of the opposite sex by a combination of two things: the level of wealth (which is determined by 
the first-period savings rate) and the value of emotional utility. This implies that, in partial 
equilibrium, raising savings rate is a channel for a man (or a woman) to improve his (her) 
standing relative to his (her) competitors in the marriage market. 
The matching of men and women in the marriage market is assumed to follow the Gale-
Shapley (1962) “deferred acceptance” algorithm: First, each man proposes to his first choice. 
When a woman obtains multiple proposals, she rejects all unacceptable proposals, and “holds” 
the most preferred one in this round. Second, every man who is rejected in one round proposes in 
the next round to his next best woman among those who haven’t rejected him. Each woman 
“holds” the most preferred suitor up to then, and rejects the rest. Third, the process repeats itself 
until no new proposal is made. With this assumption, there exists a unique and stable equilibrium 
(pairs of men and women), and the equilibrium features a positive assortative matching - the best 
man and the best woman are matched, the second best man and the second best woman are 
matched, etc. If there is a sex ratio imbalance, the lowest ranked men are not married. 
The key proposition in Du and Wei (2010) can be summarized as follows (with intuition 
provided when possible). As the sex ratio increases, a representative man raises his savings rate 
(with the hope of improving his chance of success in the marriage market). In the benchmark 
model where there is no intra-household bargaining within a marriage, a representative woman 
decreases her savings rate in response to a rise in the sex ratio, because she expects to free-ride 
on her future husband’s higher savings rate. However, in an extension when they consider intra-7 
 
household bargaining (the relative bargaining power is partly a function of the relative pre-
marriage wealth level between the husband and the wife), the effect of a rise in the sex ratio on a 
representative woman’s savings rate becomes ambiguous. The desire to avoid erosion in 
bargaining power within marriage may induce the woman to raise her savings rate in response to 
a rise in the sex ratio; this offsets the desire to free-ride on her future husband’s higher savings 
rate. In both the benchmark model and the extension, the aggregate savings rate unambiguously 
increases in response to a rise in the sex ratio.  
The last result is easy to understand when there is intra-household bargaining and women 
do not decrease their savings in order to avoid major erosion in bargaining power. But when 
there is no intra-household bargaining, and women do decrease their savings, what ensures that 
the aggregate savings rate goes up in? The answer is when men anticipate that women may 
decrease their savings, men raise their savings rate even more to compensate
2. In calibrations of 
the model, a rise in the sex ratio from a balanced level to 1.15 (which is approximately the level 
of the sex ratio for the pre-marital age cohort in China in 2007) would lead to an increase in the 
aggregate household savings rate by 6-10 percentage points, which is about 30-60% of the actual 
increase in the household savings rate observed in the Chinese data. 
In this model, the high savings rate is inefficient for men: men raise their savings rate in 
the hope of improving their relative competitiveness in the marriage market. Yet, in the 
aggregate, the number of men who cannot get married is independent of their savings rate. If a 
central planner could coordinate the men’s savings behavior, they would all reduce their savings 
proportionately without a negative consequence on their marriage outcome. Even though women 
benefit from a higher savings rate by men, in calibrations with transferable utilities, it is shown 
that a higher aggregate savings rate due to a higher sex ratio is socially inefficient in general. 
Outside the Du-Wei model, it is useful to point out some other forces that could raise the 
savings rate even by parents without a son. The first is a housing price channel. Parents with a 
son (or unmarried men) may attempt to increase their competitiveness by buying a larger and 
                                                 
2 The proposition requires the sex ratio to be below some threshold. The intuition is this: When the probability of a marriage is 
already sufficiently small, a further marginal improvement in the marriage probability from raising the savings rate (from an 
already high level) is not worth the sacrifice. Therefore, any additional increase in the sex ratio may lead men to give up (by 
switching to a mixed strategy). However, if men derive enough utility from having a marriage partner, then the threshold value of 
the sex ratio imbalance is high. In calibrations, Du and Wei find the threshold to be greater than 2. Since no economy in the data 
has a sex ratio higher than 1.3, this threshold is not reached in the real world. 8 
 
nicer house, and may bid up housing prices in a region with an unbalanced sex ratio. As a 
consequence, even parents without a son have to save more in order to afford housing. The 
second is a “tournament effect.” When the wealth of rich men rises, the reward for a woman to 
be matched with a rich man also rises. If a women’s family wealth improves her chance to be 
matched with a wealthy man, her parents’ willingness to save also rises. For a theoretical model 
that can deliver this result, see Peters and Siow, 2002. 
This discussion has clear implications for empirical work. First, it would be useful to 
check how savings by households with a son or with a daughter respond to local sex ratios. 
Second, because different households may respond differently to the same change in the sex ratio, 
it is useful to go beyond household data and estimate the net effect of higher local sex ratios on 
aggregate savings rates. Third, it would be informative to check if local housing prices are 
indeed linked to local sex ratios. 
 
3. Statistical Evidence 
 
  Since late 1990s, both the sex ratio for marriage-age youths and the savings rate in China 
have been rising. In Figure 1, we present a time series plot of standardized versions of both 
variables.
3 The sex ratio at birth is lagged by twenty years, since the median age of first marriage 
for Chinese women is 20. It is clear that the two variables are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.822). While this is highly suggestive, it is not a rigorous proof by itself. 
 
3.1 Background information on the marriage market and savings behavior 
Left to nature, the sex ratio at birth (in a society without massive starvation) is generally 
around 106 boys per 100 girls (with human biology compensating for a slightly higher mortality 
rate for boys than girls). The sex ratio was balanced or slightly below normal in the 1960s and 
1970s (most likely due to malnutrition). The sex ratio at birth in China was close to normal in 
1980 (with 106 boys per 100 girls), but has climbed steadily since the mid-1980s to over 120 
boys for each 100 girls in 2005 (Li, 2007; Zhu, Lu, and Hesketh, 2009) and estimated to be 124 
                                                 
3 standardized variable = (raw variable – mean)/standard deviation. 9 
 
boys/100 girls in 2007. By 2005, men outnumbered women at age 25 or below by about 30 
million. The excess men cannot be married mathematically. The number of unmarried men –
sometimes referred to as “bare branches” in colloquial Chinese – continues to rise as the sex ratio 
imbalance deteriorates
4. Some men may partner off as gays, and others may emigrate or marry 
women from other countries. Because the scale of the “bare branches” is so large – 30 million 
men are more than the entire female population of Canada – and because most “bare branches” 
come from low income households, actions by a small portion of men do not provide a practical 
solution to the problem. In any case, a rising sex ratio imbalance must imply a diminishing 
probability that a man will find a bride
5. 
 
Self-reported reasons for savings 
  A survey of rural households (Chinese Household Income Project) in 2002 asked 
households why they save. There were seven possible reasons: (1) children’s wedding, (2) 
children’s education, (3) bequest to children, (4) building a house, (5) retirement, (6) medical 
expenses, and (7) others. We group the first three reasons as “directly related to children.”  
In Table 1, we tabulate percentage of households that designate a given category as either 
the most important or the second most important reason for savings. (Note that the sum of the 
numbers in a column can be more than 100% because a household can list one category as the 
most important, and the other category as the second most important.) In the first two columns, 
we focus on households with a husband and a wife plus a child. We tabulate the answers from 
households with a son in the first column, and those from households with a daughter in the 
second column. 92.2 percent of the son-households give at least one factor directly related to 
                                                 
4 If some new-born girls are not reported by their parents with hopes to be pregnant again with a son, then the sex ratio imbalance 
at birth could be overstated in official statistics. To assess the quantitative importance of this possibility, we compare the sex ratio 
at birth in the 1990 population census with the sex ratio for the 10-year-olds in the 2000 census. It is reasonable to assume that 
parents would not hide their 10-year-old girls from census-takers in 2000. First, those parents who would like to try for another 
child in 1990 most likely would have done so already within ten years, and have paid a fine for violating family planning policy 
by 2000. In addition, there were also positive incentives to report girls who have reached school age since registration was 
required for (free) immunization shots and school attendance. Since the sex ratios for both the new-borns in 1990 and the 10-
year-old children in 2000 were 1.12, we conclude that the under-reported infant girls, as a proportion of the total number of new-
born girls, are not large enough to make a noticeable distortion to the reported sex ratio imbalance. Zhu, Li and Hesketh (2009) 
reached the same conclusion with a somewhat different methodology. 
5 A fraud has emerged in which some women pretend to be willing to marry bachelors in return for a bride price (“cai li”) on the 
order of RMB 40,000 (about US$5900, or “five years’ worth of farm income”). The women would then run away with the bride 
price (“It’s cold cash, not cold feet, motivating runaway brides in China,” by Mei Fong, Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2009). 10 
 
their son as their primary or secondary reason for savings. This number is 5.8 percentage points 
higher than the percentage of daughter-households who give similar answers. It is also telling to 
look at savings for children’s wedding: 29.8% of son-families list savings for their son’s 
wedding as the primary or secondary most important reason for savings, versus only 18.3% of 
daughter-families who give the same answer.  
Interestingly, when it comes to children’s education, a majority of both son-families and 
daughter-families save for this purpose (79.2% versus 75.9%, respectively), and the difference is 
small. When it comes to bequest, there is virtually no difference between the two types of 
households. It is important to point out that these numbers do not directly reveal the intensity of 
savings for a given type of household. (For that, we will perform formal regression analyses.) 
In the last three columns of Table 1, we look at four-person households with a father, a 
mother and two children. There are three types of such households: those with two girls, those 
with a girl and a boy, and those with two boys. The relative differences are similar to three-
person households. More precisely, households with at least one son are more likely to report 
that their savings are primarily for their children, particularly for their children’s wedding.  
Note that among the factors labeled as “not directly related to children,” “building a 
house” for families with a son could very well be motivated by a desire to help their sons to 
improve the marriage prospect. Our personal interviews with families in rural areas suggest to us 
that most families with a son believe that having a house for a son is essential for their son’s 
prospect in successfully finding a wife. Because the CHIP survey does not allow us to separate 
“building a house for their children’s wedding” from building a house for other reasons, we do 
not include “building a house” as a part of the “savings reasons directly related to children.”  
 
Savings rates and wedding events 
Our hypothesis connects sex ratio to savings rate through pressure in the marriage market. 
It is therefore desirable to have some evidence on whether household savings rates actually vary 
with the timing of a wedding event in the family, and whether the pattern differs between 
households with a son and those with a daughter. Unfortunately, most household surveys do not 11 
 
ask about the timing or costs of wedding events in a way that would allow one to trace out a time 
series profile of a household’s savings rate with respect to wedding events. 
Fortunately, for 18 natural villages (in three administrative villages) in Guizhou Province, 
two rounds of household census were conducted in 2005 and 2007 by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (with one of the authors as a project leader). In each round, all 
households were asked their income and expenditure in the previous year. The second round 
survey also includes recall data of major events, such as weddings in a family, in the preceding 
ten years. From this data set, we construct a time series profile of a “typical” household’s savings 
rate with respect to the timing of a wedding, i.e., the savings rate 2 years before the wedding, 1 
year before the wedding, the year of the wedding, and so on, all the way to 4 years after the 
wedding. By a “typical” household, we mean that we take the average across households with 
the same number of years distant from a wedding. For example, for the savings rate in the year of 
a wedding, we average the savings rate across all households that have a wedding in that year. 
Because the number of households that have a wedding event is relatively small, we do not have 
enough statistical power to include control variables or to perform formal tests on the differences 
in the average savings rates across years or across household types. So the result should be 
interpreted with these limitations in mind. 
Figure 2 plots the time profile of a representative household savings rate for groom and 
bride families, respectively
6. The horizontal axis stands for the number of years away from the 
time of a wedding. The vertical axis depicts the average household savings rate measured by the 
formula, (income-expenditure)/income*100. Three patterns in the graph are particularly 
suggestive. First, the two savings rate curves exhibit an inverse-V shape, peaking in the year 
before the wedding. The savings rate is as high as 50% for a groom’s family. (The median 
wedding cost for the groom’s family was 18,150 RMBs in 2006, exceeding 800% of the per 
capita income in the sample. Because a wedding event itself represents a major expenditure, it is 
not surprising that the savings rate for the year of a wedding is lower.) Second, household 
savings rates tend to be much lower after a wedding rather than recovering to the pre-wedding 
level, suggesting that a big part of household savings is motivated by wedding-related 
                                                 
6 To reduce noise, the top and bottom of 5% outliers in terms of savings rates are dropped from the sample.  12 
 
expenditures. Third, the savings rate curve for a groom’s family lies almost everywhere above 
the curve for a bride’s family (except in the year after a wedding). This suggests that savings for 
marriage is more important for a groom’s family than for a bride’s family. (The savings rate for a 
bride’s family turns negative in some years after the wedding, possibly indicating that they 
consume more than their income due to a transfer from the groom’s family.)  
While this piece of evidence comes from a rural location, the patterns revealed are 
consistent with the cultural norms in both urban and rural areas. In particular, a groom’s family is 
more likely than a bride’s family to be expected to provide a house or an apartment for the 
newlyweds, or at least to contribute the biggest chunk of the cost for a domicile. A groom’s 
family is often responsible for paying his bride’s family a one-time transfer that compensates the 
latter for rearing their daughter (Zhang and Chan, 1999). In addition, the groom’s family bears 
most of the financial cost of holding a wedding ceremony although the bride’s family may share 
some of the cost as well. Because weddings in China are occasions that call for significant cash 
outlays, families may have to save more before weddings. Brown, Bulte and Zhang (2010) show 
that families of a groom expend more on both the wedding ceremony and the bride price over 
time, while the families of a bride do not.  
While the inverse V shape of the savings curve in Figure 2 means that savings rates tend 
to decline after a wedding, it does not imply that the net consequence of a higher sex ratio on 
savings rates is zero. First, in a society with a positive population growth rate, the sum of the 
extra savings by families preparing for a wedding may grow faster than the sum of the dis-
savings by post-wedding families. Second, more importantly, in response to a rising sex ratio, the 
entire savings curve is likely to shift upwards, especially for households with a son. In addition, 
parents may save for their children and wish to leave a positive bequest for their children. 
 
Material wealth and marriage likelihood 
  A key assumption of our story is that a higher level of family wealth improves a man’s 
chance in the marriage market. We look for evidence in this regard. Note first that the social 
norm in China is such that most unmarried young men or women live with their parents. As a 
result, household surveys rarely capture households consisting of a single unmarried person. 13 
 
(Married children, on the other hand, have their own households, and do not appear in their 
parents’ households in the survey.) We make an indirect educated guess on the marital status of 
eligible bachelors from the CHIP data by looking at households whose head is 50-60 years old. 
Their children are likely to be in the 25-35 age range. We check if family wealth reduces the 
likelihood that such a household has an unmarried adult child living with them. 
In rural areas, virtually every household has a house, but the quality varies a great deal. A 
house built of concrete, bricks, or stones is likely of higher quality (and more expensive) than a 
house built of mud and straw. The regression in Column 1 of Table 2 shows that households with 
a son are much less likely to have an unmarried adult son staying at home if they have a 
relatively higher-quality house. In comparison, in Column 2, the marriage status of a daughter 
(for daughter-families) is unrelated to the relative quality of the parents’ house. A multinomial 
logit (reported in Columns 3-4 of Table 2) confirms the same pattern. 
In urban areas, all apartments or houses are built of concrete and/or bricks. However, 
some people are owners and others are renters. Generally speaking, owners are wealthier than 
renters. Column 5 shows that son-families are much less likely to have an unmarried adult son at 
home if they are a house owner (as opposed to a renter). This is consistent with the idea that a 
higher level of wealth makes a man more marriageable. 
  We also look at the likelihood that an adult child is married in rural Guizhou based on the 
same census of the households in 18 natural villages that is used in Figure 2. While this is a 
much smaller sample than the CHIPS data set, it contains an estimate of the value of the family 
house (likely the most important piece of household wealth). In addition, all the marriages that 
occurred during 1996-2006 are recorded. Since there are no home mortgages, rural families 
construct their houses and own them outright. Table 3 reports a set of logit regressions on the 
likelihood that an adult son (or daughter) is married. Among families with at least one adult son 
(older than 19), a higher level of housing wealth is a statistically significant predictor of the 
likelihood that the adult son gets married. Family income also has a positive coefficient but is not 
statistically significant. In comparison, among families with at least one adult daughter (older 
than 17), the level of housing wealth is not significant, but a higher level of family income is a 
positive and significant predictor for the likelihood that the daughter is married.  14 
 
Determinants of sex ratio imbalance 
Sex ratio imbalance comes almost entirely from sex selective abortions. This, in turn, 
results from a combination of three factors: (a) parental preference for sons; (b) some limit to the 
number of children a couple is allowed or wants to have, which for the Chinese is a strict family 
planning policy; and (c) availability of inexpensive technology to screen the sex of a fetus 
(Ultrasound B in particular) and to perform abortions. The strict version of the family planning 
policy was put into place in the early 1980s. Ultrasound B machines gradually became 
widespread in Chinese hospitals and clinics starting from mid-1980s. 
Our empirical work will start with regressions that assume exogenous sex ratios. This 
assumption can be justified by recognizing that parental preference for sons is part of a culture, 
and as such, it changes only very slowly. Korea has experienced a sustained increase in its sex 
ratio imbalance for about 25 to 30 years, which has only recently started to decline; this evidence 
is consistent with our assumption (Guilmoto, 2007).  
We nonetheless also report instrumental variable regressions that allow for potential 
endogeneity of (and measurement error in) sex ratios. The instrumental variables for sex ratio in 
the pre-marital age cohort explore regional variations in the financial penalty for violating birth 
quotas, set by regional governments years before newborns grow to marriageable age. 
 
Low mobility for marriage and the invisible hand 
  As we will explore variations across provinces in sex ratios and savings rates, it is useful 
to know how local the marriage market is. First, according to the China population census of 
2000, 92% of rural residents live in their county of birth, and 62% of urban residents live in the 
city of their birth.  Second, in rural China, 89 percent of marriages take place between husbands 
and wives from the same county. Since a county is a smaller geographic unit (a typical province 
may have more than 100 counties), the percentage is surely higher for marriages between men 
and women from the same province. Third, the CHIP migrant workers survey in 2000 shows that 
82% of the migrant working families in cities report that the husbands and wives come from the 
same province. This suggests that migrant workers often get married before leaving their 
hometown to look for a job. To sum up, mobility for marriage reasons appears limited. 15 
 
For sex ratios to affect savings rates, parents don’t have to know local sex ratio statistics. 
There is an invisible hand at work. Consider two otherwise identical households with a son, one 
in a region with a high sex ratio, and the other in a region with a low sex ratio. Parents in the first 
region would observe or be told by relatives or colleagues that it is difficult for their sons to find 
a girlfriend and expensive to marry. The expectation for how much the parents need to contribute 
to their son’s new household, given costs of housing, cars, furniture, or honeymoons, would 
differ in the two regions. The types of furniture, cars and honeymoons, and local housing prices 
may reflect the degree of competition in a local marriage market, and thus affect the savings 
required of parents with a son. In other words, even without the knowledge of local sex ratio 
statistics, parents may make savings decisions that reflect the local sex ratio. 
 
3.2 Household-level evidence 
Our sample is drawn from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) of 2002, which 
covers 122 rural counties and 70 cities. One may be tempted to compare savings rates for 
households with sons and those with daughters. But this comparison is not particularly 
informative for our hypothesis. Under the hypothesis of a competitive saving motive, one 
expects that families with a son will save more, if other things are held constant. However, other 
things cannot be held constant because parents may not expect to get the same degree of help 
from their daughters than from their sons as they age, especially in a rural area where a woman 
moves to live with a man’s family after the marriage. In other words, families with only 
daughters may need to save more to prepare for old age. For this reason, a direct comparison of 
the savings rates between these two types of households is not informative for our purpose. 
To ensure that we do not compare apples with oranges, we focus on those three-person 
nuclear families with both parents still alive, mother aged 40 or younger, and no grandparents, 
uncles, or aunts living at home. If a family has an adult child who has moved out of the family, 
the household survey does not capture this accurately (and doesn’t have information on the 
gender of the adult child). By placing an age limit on the mother, we are likely to have true three-
person families, and hence maximize the comparability across households in the sample. These 
restrictions reduce the size of the sample relative to the universe of households in the survey. 16 
 
However, as we will see, our regressions do not suffer from a lack of statistical power. (As noted 
earlier, the survey does not contain many observations of an unmarried young man or woman as 
the household head. Therefore, we are not able to analyze such households directly.) 
In any case, Table 4 reports average savings rates for households with children of 
different genders. Following Chamon and Prasad (2008), we define the local savings rate by log 
(income net of taxes / living expenditure). This definition is less susceptible to extreme values, 
and makes the error term more likely to satisfy the normality assumption. In both rural and urban 
areas, households with a son have a higher average savings rate than those with a daughter (39% 
versus 32% in rural areas, and 31% versus 30% in urban areas). However, none of the 
differences in savings rates is statistically significant; the standard deviation of the savings rate 
within any type of households easily overwhelms the difference between any two types of 
households. Of course, large standard deviations also suggest the presence of considerable noise 
in the savings data. In any case, we cannot confirm or reject our hypothesis by comparing the 
savings rates across household types in this way. 
  Our hypothesis, however, implies a particular regional variation in savings rates: 
households with a son should save more in a region with a more unbalanced sex ratio, holding 
constant family income and other characteristics. Moreover, this pattern is not predicted by either 
the life-cycle theory or by existing precautionary savings hypotheses. Therefore, examining 
regional variations may be particularly informative for testing our hypothesis. 
We can also examine the relationship between the savings rate by households with a 
daughter and the local sex ratio. Free-riding on future husbands’ wealth is not the only driver for 
savings by households with a daughter. The model of Du and Wei (2010) suggests that when 
women (or their parents) are concerned about the erosion of bargaining power within a 
household, they may respond to an anticipated increase in their future husbands’ wealth by 
raising their own savings rates.  
In the household-level regressions, we infer local sex ratios for the age cohort of 12-21 in 
2002 from the 1990 population census (the cohort was 0-9 years old in 1990). There are 
substantial regional variations. In the rural sample, the average sex ratio is 1.09, with a standard 17 
 
deviation of 0.04. The smallest and the largest values are 1.01 and 1.23, respectively. In the 
urban sample, it ranges from 1.02 to 1.24 with a mean of 1.08 and a standard deviation of 0.04.  
 
Household savings in rural areas  
The regression results for the rural sample are presented in Table 5. The first two 
regressions are performed on a full sample. The regressions control for family income, children’s 
ages, characteristics of the head of household (sex, education, and ethnic background), and local 
income inequality. It also controls for health shocks to the family by a dummy denoting “poor 
health” if the family has a disabled or severely ill member.  
Column 1 of Table 5 relates savings by households with a son to local sex ratios and 
other determinants of savings rate. We find that the local sex ratio has a strongly positive effect 
on the household savings rate (with a point estimate of 1.34 on the sex ratio, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level). An increase in the local sex ratio from 1.05 to 1.14 (the mean 
increase in rural China from 1990 to 2007; see Table 12) is associated with a higher savings rate 
by son-households by 12.1 percentage points, which is economically large (and is more than the 
actual increase in average rural household savings rate during the period). In comparison, 
Column 2 of Table 5 reports the regression concerning savings by households with a daughter. 
The coefficient on the local sex ratio is negative but not statistically significant. This is consistent 
with the interpretation in Du and Wei (2010) that conflicting motives faced by daughter-families 
have offset each other, resulting in an ambiguous net effect. 
Since the large standard deviations in the savings rates reported in Table 4 likely reflect 
noise, we conduct a sequence of additional regressions where possible outliers are removed 
through three different filters. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, we take out a small number of 
households either whose reported annual family income or reported annual expenditure is less 
than 2000 Chinese yuans. (Such income or expenditure seems too low to be realistic, possibly 
due to underestimation of imputed non-market income or expenditure.) The same qualitative 
patterns are preserved. In particular, the savings rate by son-families rises with the local sex ratio, 
but the savings rate by daughter-families is insensitive to the local sex ratio. In fact, the point 18 
 
estimate on the sex ratio is now (moderately) bigger for the son families, and smaller for the 
daughter-families. 
In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we remove the top and bottom 5% of the households 
(within each household type) in terms of their savings rates. In Columns 7 and 8, we remove 
those households which do not explicitly give marital status for their child (in addition to 
removing the top and bottom 5% of the households in terms of their savings rates). In both cases, 
we observe the same patterns: the coefficient on the sex ratio is positive and significant for son-
families, but not different from zero for daughter-families. 
In Table 6, we report additional robustness checks. First, we expand the sample to 
include all households whose mothers are no older than 45 (as opposed to 40 in Table 5). (One 
important caveat is that the newly added households could contain many multiple-children 
households that are erroneously classified as one-child families, because older children who have 
moved out after marriage are not recorded as members of the household. This could be a 
problem since the data don’t tell us if the older children are sons or daughters.) Second, we 
expand the sample to include extended families (those with grandparents, uncles or aunts). Third, 
we report median regressions as well as OLS regressions. Fourth, we apply four additional filters 
similar to Table 5. These produce a total of ten pairs of new regressions. For each pair, we 
always obtain the same patterns: the coefficient on the sex ratio is positive and statistically 
significant for the son-families, but not significant (and sometimes negative) for daughter-
families. We therefore conclude that a robust feature of the data is that savings by son-families 
tend to be higher in regions with a more skewed sex ratio. In contrast, the net effect of the sex 
ratio imbalance on savings by daughter families appears to be zero. 
In Table 7, we pool the two household types into the same regression(s). We include an 
interaction term between the local sex ratio and a dummy if the family has a son. An advantage 
of this specification is that a simple t-test on the interaction term can tell us whether the son-
families and daughter-families react differently to a given rise in the sex ratio. A disadvantage is 
that (additional) estimation bias can be introduced if we inappropriately impose the condition 
that the parameters on all other variables are the same for different types of households.  The first 
two columns report OLS and median regressions for one-child households including extended 19 
 
families. The last two columns report OLS and median regressions on nuclear families only. In 
all regressions, the coefficient on the interaction between the son dummy and the sex ratio is 
positive and significant, but the coefficient on the sex ratio itself is not significant. In other words, 
son-families do not intrinsically have a higher savings rate than daughter-families. Instead, it 
takes a combination of having a son and living in a region with a high sex ratio for the family to 
have a higher savings rate. This is very much consistent with our story. 
It might be interesting to see if the savings response to the local sex ratio varies with 
family income. In Table 8, we create dummies for households in different income quartiles 
(within a region), and interact them with the local sex ratio. If one just looks at the point 
estimates, there is some evidence that the savings response by son-families is moderately weaker 
for lower-income families (possibly because some of these families give up their hope for 
marriage for their sons and therefore stop competing through savings). However, the difference 
in savings responses across income groups is not statistically significant. Similarly, there is no 
significant difference in the savings responses by daughter-families across income quartiles. 
 
Household savings in urban areas 
  We now turn to urban household savings. Ex ante, the relative strength of the savings 
response to a rise in the sex ratio between the urban and the rural samples is ambiguous.  First, 
the more educated segment of the urban population could be more mobile (e.g., college students 
from other regions may stay on to work in the city of their college after graduation). This would 
make the local sex ratio statistics inferred from the population census less accurate in describing 
the true sex ratio in the local marriage market. The noise in the sex ratio measure could induce a 
downward bias in the estimates. Second, since urban residents have a higher income than rural 
residents on average, the marriage challenge might be solved by importing brides from adjacent 
rural areas. However, mobility for most urban residents is still limited. (As noted earlier, most 
urban residents live and work where they were born.) Furthermore, the practice of importing 
brides from rural areas is not widespread. As noted earlier, during the 5-year period 1995-2000, 
only 4% of marriage-age people change their place of residency due to marriage.  20 
 
There are reasons for urban residents to react more strongly to a given rise in the sex ratio. 
In particular, because the housing market is organized differently between urban and rural areas, 
a given rise in the sex ratio may bid up housing prices more in urban areas (a possibility that we 
will check and confirm later). Since parents of a son are often expected to help out with the cost 
of purchasing an apartment for the newly-wed, this would translate into greater pressure to raise 
their savings rates. Because parents of a daughter (and indeed all other households) also need to 
buy an apartment, they may have to raise their own savings rate (cutting down non-housing 
consumption) in response to a rise in the local sex ratio, especially if the benefit of greater 
savings by men mainly accrues to women instead of to their parents. 
In the first two columns of Table 9, we contrast the saving behavior between households 
with a son and those with a daughter. The coefficients on the sex ratio are positive and 
significant for both types of households. In fact, the point estimate in the second column is 
bigger than in the first column (1.85 versus 1.54), although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Because of concerns for noise in the data, we attempt to remove possible outliers 
through a number of filters, similar to what we do with the rural sample. In Columns 3-4, we 
exclude those households whose reported annual income or expenditure is less than 3000 yuans 
(Such income or expenditure seems implausible low
7). This results in a reversal of the relative 
size of the two coefficients. That is, the sex ratio has a larger effect on savings by son families 
than by daughter families, although the difference is still not statistically significant.  
Similar to the rural household sample, an uncommon one-time expenditure such as a big 
hospital bill could make a household’s savings rate appear unusually low. Conversely, an 
uncommon one-time income such as a lottery win could make the savings rate appear unusually 
high. Neither is representative of how much a household intends to save under normal 
circumstances. In Columns 5-6, we exclude the top and bottom 5% of households in terms of 
their savings rate. In Columns 7-8, we exclude families with no explicit information on the 
marital status of their children (in addition to removing the top and bottom 5% of households in 
terms of their savings rate). In both cases, the coefficient on the local sex ratio is greater for son 
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families than for daughter families. In fact, in Column 8, the coefficient for daughter-families is 
no longer statistically different from zero. 
  In Table 10, we report a sequence of additional robustness checks (similar to the set of 
checks reported in Table 6 for the rural sample). First, we extend the sample to include all three-
person households with mother no more than 45 years old (with the caveat that the newly added 
households may not be true one-child families). Second, we consider both extended families (e.g., 
those with grandparents) as well as nuclear families. Third, we conduct both median regressions 
and ordinary least squares. Fourth, we apply four (independent) filters to the expanded sample. 
In all, there are 20 pairs of new regressions. In all cases, the coefficient on the sex ratio for son-
families is always positive and statistically significant. The coefficient for daughter families is 
mostly but not always statistically significant. Once a filtering rule to remove outliers is applied, 
the coefficient is mostly greater for son families than for daughter families. We conclude that 
there is robust evidence that son families save more in cities with higher sex ratios. Daughter 
families are also likely to save more, but the evidence is weaker.  
We have also pooled all families with a child into a common regression sample, and 
include an interaction term between the local sex ratio and a dummy for son families (similar to 
Table 7 for the rural sample). We do not include a table of the regression results to save space. 
Generally speaking, the coefficient on the sex ratio is always positive and significant, but the 
interaction term is not significant. In other words, we cannot formally reject the null that son 
families and daughter families in urban areas react equally to a rise in the local sex ratio.  
For the urban sample, we have more information about the employer characteristics of 
the family members. We therefore construct a set of additional proxies to detect a precautionary 
savings motive. We create an indicator variable for households with no access to public health 
insurance, one for those with at least one family member who has been laid off, one for those 
with at least one family member employed in a state-owned company, one for those with at least 
one family member working in a company that has recently experienced a reorganization (and 
hence at risk of being laid off), and another one for households with a member working for an 
employer that has been losing money. In addition, we create a dummy for households that 
currently rent, rather than own, an apartment. All of these variables provide a richer set of 22 
 
descriptions of the vulnerability of a family to income uncertainty. We do not report a table of 
regression results to save space, but generally speaking, the positive relationship between 
household savings rates and local sex ratios remains unchanged. 
 
Discussion of alternative interpretations 
  Could the local sex ratio be correlated with some omitted variable that also affects 
household savings decisions? We have already controlled for a long list of variables that may 
reflect life-cycle considerations and precautionary savings motives. Nonetheless, there may be 
certain dimensions of quality of local social safety net, growth potential, or income uncertainty 
that are not on our long list of controls. One may imagine that a region with more intrinsic 
income uncertainty, or a greater local aversion to a given uncertainty, may simultaneously 
exhibit a higher local sex ratio imbalance and a higher local savings rate. There may be a positive 
association between household savings and local sex ratios, but it does not reflect a causal 
relationship from the sex ratio to the savings rate. Can we rule this out? 
If the local sex ratio is suspected of reflecting an unobserved location-specific shock, we 
can rule this out relatively easily. A pure location-specific shock should affect savings by all 
households in the same region in the same way. But that is not what we find in the rural sample. 
Instead, only the savings by those rural households with a son react strongly and positively to a 
rise in the local sex ratio, while savings by households with a daughter do not. 
  The next possibility is far more challenging: could a sex ratio imbalance reflect 
something that is both location and household specific? For example, a region may have an 
unusually high level of income uncertainty that is common to all households, but some 
households care about this more than others. Those households with a stronger aversion to 
uncertainty may engage in a sex selective abortion more aggressively and save more at the same 
time. By construction, selection at both household and location level is much harder to rule out 
since our unit of observation is at the same level.  
However, there are good reasons to think that if we focus on households with a single 
child, such selection is unlikely to be quantitatively significant. Ebenstein (2008) shows that sex 
ratio imbalance is overwhelmingly a result of sex selective abortions at higher orders of birth. 23 
 
That is, the sex ratio for first-born children is close to normal. This is particularly true in rural 
areas: since a second child is officially permitted if the first child is a girl, and since many 
families exhibit a preference for a balanced sex ratio (one boy and one girl) over having two 
boys (Ebenstein, 2008), there is very little reason to perform sex selective abortions on the first 
pregnancies. In contrast, the sex ratio at birth goes up substantially over time for the second-born 
children and becomes even more skewed for higher order births. Similarly, Zhu, Lu and Hesketh 
in an article on sex ratio imbalance in China published in the British Medical Journal (2009) 
concludes that: “The sex ratio at birth was close to normal for first order births
 but rose steeply 
for second order births, especially in rural
 areas, where it reached 146 (in 2005).” This suggests 
that the first son (or daughter) is unlikely to result from a sex selective abortion. Going back to 
Tables 5-6, where we restrict attention to households with only one child, we clearly see that 
those with a son exhibit a strongly positive elasticity of savings with respect to the local sex ratio, 
but those with a daughter do not.  
 
Sex ratios and housing values 
In explaining the pattern that savings by households with a daughter may also rise with 
local sex ratios, we have suggested several stories. First, parents of a daughter wish to preserve 
their daughter’s bargaining power after marriage. This offsets the desire to take advantage of the 
higher savings rate of their son-in-law. Second, the higher savings from the groom family may 
accrue mostly to the bride and the groom (e.g., in the form of a larger house), which would not 
directly help parents of the bride.  In addition, we have suggested a possible spillover channel 
through the price of housing: if a higher sex ratio leads to a higher cost of housing due to 
intensified competition by households with a son, then all other households also have to raise 
their savings in order to afford local houses. This effect is exacerbated in a country with an 
underdeveloped financial market. We now look for some direct evidence on a connection 
between local housing values and sex ratios. Because we do not have individual housing 
information with detailed housing characteristics, we cannot answer this question with hedonic 
price adjustment. Instead, we report some suggestive evidence by making use of data in the 
China Population Census 2000 on average housing values and house size on November 1, 2000 24 
 
(as specified in the Census) across 2088 rural counties and 671 cities on November 1, 2000. We 
control for local income, average household size, and age profile of the local population. 
The results are reported in Table 11. The first four regressions are on the rural sample. 
Generally speaking, a higher sex ratio is associated with both a larger average house size and a 
higher housing value. Based on the point estimate in Column 4, a 10 basis point increase in the 
local sex ratio is associated with a higher cost of housing by about 4%. As important, the 
elasticity of the housing value with respect to the local sex ratio is more than twice as big as that 
for the average house size. This implies that the cost of a housing unit, holding its size constant, 
is also higher in regions with a more unbalanced sex ratio. 
The last four columns of Table 11 examine the urban sample. We obtain similar patterns 
but even bigger point estimates. In particular, based on the estimate in the last column (0.74), a 
10 basis point increase in the local sex ratio is associated with a higher housing cost by 7.4%. 
Furthermore, the elasticity of the housing value with respect to the sex ratio is twice as big as 
that for average housing size. Therefore, the increase in total housing cost is likely to be evenly 
split by a 3.7% increase in the average housing size, and another 3.7% increase in the unit cost. 
While future research with individual housing data would have to adjust for other 
determinants of housing size and value, Table 11 is consistent with the interpretation that a 
higher sex ratio leads to more competition for bigger and more expensive houses. Since a house 
tends to be the single most expensive purchase for most families, households with no son still 
have to save more in a region with a high sex ratio. (In addition, local norms may induce them 
to want to buy a bigger house to fit in with their friends and relatives in the same social strata -- 
to keep up with the Zhangs (or Joneses)). 
 
3.3 Evidence across provinces 
Since the savings response to a rise in the sex ratio could vary by household types, this 
raises the question of what the general equilibrium effect is. We address this by examining 
provincial-level data from 1980-2007. This exercise is valid because, as documented earlier, 
mobility across provinces for the purpose of marriage is low. (If the mobility were high, then 
even if our story is correct, we may not find any association between sex ratios and savings rates.)  25 
 
Summary statistics for local savings rates, sex ratios and a few other key variables are 
provided in Table 12. The average sex ratio for age cohort 7-21 across provinces rose from 1.045 
in 1990 to 1.136 in 2007. Provinces with extreme values of sex ratios at birth are tabulated in 
Table 13. For example, in 2005, Jiangxi, Shannxi and Anhui had sex ratios of 1.37, 1.32 and 1.32, 
respectively.  Ignoring for the moment migration, reporting errors, and differential mortality 
rates between girls and boys, these numbers suggest that more than one out of every six boys 
born in 2005 in these provinces will end up being single in their adulthood. 
 
Panel regressions across provinces 
We perform a panel regression that links a location j’s savings rate in year t with the sex 
ratio for the appropriate age cohort in that same location and year, controlling for location fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and other factors. To be precise, our specification is the following: 
 
Savings_ratej,t = β Sex_ratio j,t +X j, t Γj,t + province fixed effects + year dummies +e j,t 
 
The savings rate is defined as local income (Y) minus consumption (C), divided by income (Y). 
We cluster the standard errors by province. 
Ideally, we would like to know sex ratios for a fixed age cohort in every region and in 
every year. However, such data are not available as the Chinese population census is carried out 
only once every few years (in 1982, 1990 and 2000). Moreover, only the 2000 census offers 
public data for individual age groups at the provincial level. Given these constraints, we make 
the following short cut: we focus on the sex ratios for the age cohort 7-21 in all years, inferred 
from the 2000 population census. For example, for the age cohort 7-21 in 2007, we infer their 
sex ratio from the age cohort 0-19 in the 2000 census, since the two groups should theoretically 
be the same. Similarly, for the age cohort 7-21 in 1990, we infer their statistics from the cohort 
17-31 in the 2000 census; and so on.  
A caveat with this method is that the actual sex ratio is likely to be different from the 
inferred one for all years other than 2000. In particular, because the mortality rates for boys and 
young men are generally slightly higher than those for girls and young women, we may under-
estimate the true sex ratios for years before 2000 and over-estimate them for years after 2000. 26 
 
However, under the assumption that measurement errors are common across all regions in any 
given year (but may vary from year to year), we can eliminate the effect of measurement errors 
by including year fixed effects in regressions. 
In Column 1 of Table 14, we report regression results with only sex ratio, log income and 
proportions of the local population in the age brackets of 0-19 and 20-59, respectively (plus 
province and year fixed effects). The effect of local income on local savings rates is positive: a 
one percent increase in income is associated with a higher savings rate by 0.20 percentage points. 
The coefficient on local sex ratio is 0.28 and statistically different from zero at the 5% level. In 
other words, the local savings rates tend to be higher in regions with a more unbalanced sex ratio. 
The age profile of local populations produces some puzzling patterns relative to the 
prediction of the life cycle hypothesis. The share of working age population (the age cohort of 
20-59) has a negative coefficient. This means that old-age households and households with 
children save more than do households in between. We note that this is consistent with the notion 
that parents save more when they have children, and that old people save more either because 
they have a strong bequest motive, or because they realize their financial need in old age is 
greater. In any case, we note that similar patterns are documented in Chamon and Prasad (2009). 
Because men and women may have different savings rates and different income levels, 
one might worry that income inequality could affect local savings rates directly, and that a sex 
ratio imbalance is simply a proxy for earnings inequality. For a subset of provinces and years, we 
can measure local income inequality directly by the Gini coefficient.
8 In Column 2 of Table 14, 
we add the local Gini coefficient as an additional control. The coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero (and the point estimate is negative). With this much reduced sample, the 
coefficient on the local sex ratio is still positive and significant. The point estimate jumps to 0.58.  
Since the skewed sex ratio comes in part from the strict version of the family planning 
policy, and since the family planning policy also produces a lower fertility rate, one wonders if 
the sex ratio is simply a proxy for the fertility rate. In Column 3, we include the local fertility 
rate in the same pre-marital age cohort as an independent variable. It turns out that the new 
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and 28 provinces in 1996 and 1999 for the urban sample, and 27 provinces in 1988, and 28 provinces in all other years for the 
rural sample. The Gini coefficients at the province level are approximated by weighted average of rural and urban coefficients. 27 
 
regressor is not statistically significant. In contrast, the local sex ratio is still positive and highly 
significant. In Column 4, we include local life expectancy as an additional regressor to account 
for the possibility that households save more when they expect to live longer.
9  The coefficient 
on the new regressor is positive but not statistically significant. 
The existing literature has hypothesized that rising income and job uncertainty is what 
motivates the Chinese to save more. In Column 5, we use the proportion of the local labor force 
that works for state-owned firms or government agencies as a proxy for the degree of job 
security. We also include the share of local labor force enrolled in social security as a proxy for 
the extent of the local social safety net. Under the precautionary savings hypothesis, the savings 
rate should decline with better job security or better social security coverage. Both coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant. These patterns support the precautionary saving motive. 
In any case, the coefficient on sex ratio is still positive and significant. In fact, the point estimate 
(0.32) becomes larger. This suggests that the competitive saving motive has independent 
explanatory power from the precautionary saving motive. 
  Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2008) point out that, assuming habit formation in 
consumption, the savings rate should be higher in a fast-growing economy since consumption 
growth may not catch up with income growth immediately. In Column 6, we add the local 
growth rate of the preceding five years. It turns out to have a negative coefficient, which is 
consistent with a more standard model of consumption smoothing without habit formation. In 
any case, the coefficient on local sex ratio is still positive (0.24) and statistically significant. To 
summarize the discussion so far, across the first six columns in Table 14, the positive association 
between a high local sex ratio and a high local savings rate is robust and statistically significant. 
To see whether parents start to save for their children’s marriage when their children are 
relatively young or when they are already very close to the marriage age, we break down the sex 
ratio into two components: one for the age cohort 7-15 and the other for the cohort 16-21. When 
we enter the two sex ratios one by one (Columns 7 and 8), each has a positive and significant 
coefficient. When we enter them simultaneously (Column 9), both are significant. The difference 
between the two point estimates (0.17-0.14=0.03) is not significant (less than the standard 
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deviation of either estimate). The sum of the two coefficients is equal to the coefficient on the 
sex ratio for the wider age cohort 7-21 in Column 5
10. We interpret these patterns as evidence 
that parents start to save for their children when they are relatively young, and the sex ratio 
imbalance in the different segments of the pre-marital age cohort matters approximately equally. 
  
Instrumental variable regressions 
  Local sex ratios for the pre-marital age cohort are pre-determined by parental decisions -- 
whether to undertake a sex selective abortion before a child is born -- taken many years prior to 
the corresponding savings variables in the regressions. Nonetheless, as we have noted earlier, sex 
ratios may be measured with errors since they are inferred from the 2000 population census. In 
this case, the estimated elasticity of the savings with respect to the sex ratio is biased downward. 
A solution to both measurement errors and possible endogeneity is to employ an 
instrumental variable approach, which we turn to now. A key determinant of the sex ratio 
imbalance is a strict family planning policy introduced in the early 1980s.
11  We explore two 
determinants of local sex ratios that are unlikely to be affected by local savings rates, and for 
which we can get data. First, while the goals of family planning are national, the enforcement is 
local. Ebenstein (2008) proposes to use regional variations in the monetary penalties for violating 
the family planning policy as an instrument for the local sex ratio. Using data collected by 
Scharping (2003) and extending them to more recent years, Ebenstein focuses on two dimensions 
of penalties: (a) a monetary penalty for the violation of policy, expressed as a percent of local 
annual income, and (b) a dummy for the existence of an extra penalty for having higher order 
unsanctioned births (e.g., for having a third child in a 1-child zone, or for having a fourth child in 
a two-child zone). These two variables are part of our set of instruments too.  
Second, while the Han ethnic group faces a strict birth quota, the rest of the population 
(i.e., 50-some ethnic minority groups) faces much less stringent quotas. (The government 
                                                 
10 We obtain similar results if the sex ratio is broken down into those for four age cohorts, 7-10, 11-13, 14-17, and 18-21. 
11 China’s family planning policy, commonly known as the “one-child policy,” has many nuances. Since 1979, the central 
government has stipulated that Han families in urban areas should normally have only child (with some exceptions). The Han is 
the majority ethnic group, accounting for about 95% of the Chinese population at the time the policy was introduced. Families in 
rural areas can generally have a second child if the first one is a daughter (this is referred to as the “1.5 children policy” by 
Ebenstein, 2008). Ethnic minority (i.e., non-Han) groups are generally exempted from birth quotas. Non-Han groups account for 
a relatively significant share of local populations in Xinjiang, Yunnan, Ganshu, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. 29 
 
allowed the exemption, possibly to avoid criticisms for using the family planning policy to 
marginalize minority groups.) Since non-Han Chinese are not uniformly distributed across space, 
this variation offers one more possible instrument (Bulte, Heerink and Zhang, 2010). In 
Appendix Table 1, we report evidence that inter-racial marriages involving Han and most of the 
54 other ethnic groups are common in China. (The primary exceptions are marriages between 
Hans and Uigers and between Hans and Tibetans.) 
12 
  In Table 15, we report the first-stage regressions for 2SLS that link local sex ratios to 
their determinants, with both financial penalties and minority shares lagged by 14 years (to 
match the median birth year for the age cohort 7-21). In the first three columns, we enter the 
three potential instrumental variables one by one. Each variable is statistically significant, and 
has the expected sign. First, more severe financial penalties are indeed associated with a more 
unbalanced sex ratio. Second, the proportion of people not subject to birth quotas is negatively 
related to the local sex ratio imbalance.  
In Column 4, we enter the two financial penalty variables jointly. The coefficients on 
both variables are positive and significant, consistent with the interpretation that more stringent 
enforcement of birth quotas has led to more aggressive sex-selective abortions and, as a result, a 
more skewed sex ratio. In Column 5, we add the proportion of the local population that is legally 
exempted from the family planning policy. The new variable produces the (expected) negative 
sign and is statistically significant. With all three potential instruments in the same regression, 
the dummy for the existence of extra financial penalties for higher order births is no longer 
significant, but the “regular” financial penalty variable is still positive and significant. The 
adjusted R-squared for the first-stage regressions is in excess of 70%. 
  Results from the 2SLS estimation for local savings rates are reported in Table 16. In 
Column 1, the local sex ratio is instrumented by all three variables described above.  The Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test rejects the null that the bias induced by either measurement errors or 
endogeneity is not serious (with a p-value of 0.03). This indicates that the estimates from a 
(correctly specified) 2SLS procedure are more reliable than the straightforward panel estimates. 
                                                 
12 In principle, variations in the cost of sex screening technology, especially the use of an Ultrasound B machine, and the 
economic status of women (such as that documented in Qian, 2008), could also be candidates for instrumental variables. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the relevant data. Note, however, for the validity of the instrumental variable regressions, we do 
not need a complete list of the determinants of the local sex ratio in the first stage.  30 
 
The Hansen’s J statistic for over-identification fails to reject the null that the instrumental 
variables are valid (with a p-value of 0.30). With the 2SLS procedure, the local sex ratio 
continues to have a positive coefficient that is statistically different from zero. The point 
estimates, 0.61, is larger than five of the first six points estimates in Table 14. This suggests that 
an attenuation bias induced by measurement errors might have outweighed any endogeneity bias 
(if the latter exists) in the original panel regressions.  
The coefficients on the control variables are sensible. For example, regions with more 
people working in the state sector save less. An increase in the share of state sector employment 
by one percentage point is associated with a reduction in the local savings rate by 0.21 
percentage points.
13 This is consistent with a precautionary savings motive. As before, we do not 
find supportive evidence for the life cycle hypothesis. 
  In Column 2 of Table 16, we replicate the 2SLS estimation but excluding the share of 
minorities in the local population from the set of instruments. Even though the Hansen’s J test in 
the first column suggests that all three instrumental variables, including the minority share, are 
valid in a purely statistical sense, we act conservatively here and allow for the possibility that 
non-Han Chinese have a different desired rate of savings and thus should not be in the set of 
instruments. In this case, the Hansen’s J statistics still fail to reject the hypothesis that the two 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term (with a p-value of 0.56). Hence, in a 
statistical sense, the instrumental variables are valid. In any case, the (instrumented) local sex 
ratio continues to exhibit a positive and statistically significant coefficient, with the point 
estimate becoming even larger (1.08). An increase in the sex ratio for the age cohort 7-21 from 
1.05 in 1990 to 1.14 in 2007, would now lead to a rise in the local savings rate by 9.72 
percentage points (=0.09 x 1.08 x 100), accounting for 60% of the actual increase in the savings 
rate during this period ( =9.72/[(0.31-0.15)x100] ).  
In Column 3 of Table 16, we employ a single instrumental variable – the financial 
penalty for violating the birth quota that was set 14 years earlier.  We confirm the results in the 
earlier regressions: a higher local sex ratio raises the local savings rate. The point estimate (1.17) 
is even bigger than before. An increase in the sex ratio from the mean value across the provinces 
                                                 
13 The coefficient on the sex ratio variable is largely the same if we drop the SOE employment share variable.  31 
 
in 1990 to the mean value in 2007 would now lead to a rise in the savings rate by 10.53 
percentage points (=0.09 x 1.17 x 100), or about 66% of the actual observed increase in the mean 
savings rate across provinces during this period. 
  To summarize, the cross-province analysis provides a way to estimate the general 
equilibrium effect of a rise in the sex ratio on the savings rate. Because the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
tests suggest that there are serious biases from measurement errors in the sex ratio statistics (or 
possible endogeneity), we put more trust in the 2SLS estimations. Among the three IV estimates, 
our preferred estimate is in the 2
nd column of Table 16, because we don’t need to be concerned 
with possibly different savings habit of ethnic minorities, and because we can conduct an over-
identification test with more than one instrument. By that estimate, an increase in the sex ratio 
from 1990 to 2007 can explain about 60% of the actual increase in the savings rate in the data. 
 
Additional evidence: sex ratios and bank deposits 
Since saving is unspent income, it may reflect both passive and active decisions. It is 
useful to take a look at bank deposits, which reflect an active household decision. This is 
especially true in rural areas where cash income often takes the form of physical currency notes, 
which need to be taken to a bank branch in person for deposits. We are able to compute actual 
bank deposits per person – or more precisely, local bank deposits in 2002 divided by local 
population in 2000 – for 1,972 rural counties. In Columns 1-3 of Table 17, we regress per-capita 
bank deposits by rural county on the local sex ratio and other controls. The first regression 
considers a linear log income term and the age structure of local population; the second column 
adds a quadratic log income term. The third regression adds province fixed effects. The 
coefficients on the key regressor, sex ratio imbalance, are positive and statistically significant 
across all three specifications. The elasticity estimates for bank deposits with respect to the sex 
ratio are large. Using Column 3 as an example, the point estimate is 1.20. 
It is noteworthy that the coefficients on the two variables describing the age structure of 
local population are now supportive of the life cycle hypothesis. In particular, regions with a 
bigger share of working age population exhibit a higher bank deposit per capita.   32 
 
In the last two columns of Table 17, we regress the change in log bank deposits on the 
change in the sex ratio and other controls from 1992 to 2002. Due to missing values, the sample 
is smaller. The coefficient on the change in sex ratio is smaller (0.40), but continues to be 




This paper proposes a competitive saving motive to explain China’s high household 
savings rate. The trigger for the competitive saving is a rise in the sex ratio imbalance. Due to 
intensified competition in the marriage market, households with a son ratchet up their savings 
rates, in hopes of improving their son’s odds of finding a wife. Families with a daughter may not 
reduce their savings rate, because a desire to avoid an erosion of bargaining power by their 
daughter after marriage may offset a desire to free ride on future son-in-law’s savings. The high 
savings rate by households with a son may also spill over to other households through higher 
housing prices. (Of course, in general equilibrium, elevated savings rates are futile because the 
aggregate number of unmarried men is not changed by individual savings decisions.)  
Household data provide a way to test the hypothesis. Households with a son are found to 
save more in regions with a more skewed sex ratio, holding constant other household features. 
Interestingly, having a son per se is not associated with greater household savings. It takes a 
combination of having a son and facing a scarcity of women for these families to raise their 
savings rates. This is exactly as predicted by the competitive saving motive. Interestingly, 
households with a daughter in rural areas do not reduce their savings in response to a rise in the 
local sex ratio. There is some evidence that daughter-families in the urban sample also have a 
higher savings rate in cities with a more skewed sex ratio.  
We provide direct evidence that housing sizes and prices tend to be higher in regions with 
a higher sex ratio.  This housing value channel is much stronger in urban areas than in rural areas. 
This lends further credence to the idea of a spillover effect. 
Since savings responses to a given change in the sex ratio can vary by household types, it 
is useful to estimate the general equilibrium effects from a panel data set across Chinese 33 
 
provinces. There is clear evidence that local savings rates tend to be higher in regions with more 
unbalanced sex ratios. To go from the correlation to causality, we implement an instrumental 
variable approach by exploring regional variations in the financial penalties for violating official 
birth quotas and in the proportion of the local population that is legally exempted from the family 
planning policy. This approach enhances the confidence in the interpretation that a higher sex 
ratio has caused households to raise their savings rates. Based on our preferred IV estimate, the 
increase in the sex ratio from 1990 to 2007 can explain about 60% of the actual increase in the 
household savings rate during this period. Other explanations such as a precautionary savings 
motive may collectively explain the remaining 40% of the increase in the savings. 
Accumulating more wealth is not the only way for men to compete in the marriage 
market. Parents may also invest more in their sons’ education, and push them to work harder. 
There may also be spillover from a boy’s education to a girl’s education. Furthermore, men or 
parents with a son may be more prepared to take on higher-risk and higher-return activities. A 
careful investigation of these possibilities is left for future research. 
Finally, while the paper focuses on evidence from China, the basic mechanism can be 
applied to other countries. Indeed, other economies known to have a strong sex ratio imbalance 
include Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India. These economies also happen to have 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
Sex Ratios: Regional data on sex ratios are derived from China Population Census in either 1990 
or 2000. The method of inference is explained in the text. Summary statistics for selected years (1980, 
1990, 2000 and 2007) are reported in Table 1a. The data on national level sex ratios at birth (for cohorts 
born later than 1988), used to generate Figure 1, are from Coale and Banister (1994, Table 3). Earlier data 
(for the period of 1988-1993) are from Gu and Roy (1995).  
 Savings rates:  Following Chamon and Prasad (2008), the savings rate is defined as log (per 
capita disposable income/per capita living expenditure). The per capita disposable income and living 
expenditure in cities from 1985 to 1998 and the per capita rural net income and living expenditure for the 
period of 1978-1998 are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China 
(CNBS). The data for later years are from China Statistical Yearbooks, various issues. 
The residential bank deposit and per capita GDP at the county level in 2002 are from China 
County Social and Economic Statistical Yearbooks (CNBS). 
The living space per household and average housing values (purchase value or construction cost) 
at the county/city level are from China Population Census 2000.  
   Other data used in household level regressions The rural and urban household survey data sets 
are obtained from the Chinese Household Income Project (2002), available from the website of the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/21741.xml). 37 
 
Table 1: Why Do People Save?  Self-Reported the Most or the Second Most Important Reason for Savings  
(% of Respondents) 
      Three-person households   Four-person households     All households
     Girl Boy Only girls  Boy and girl Only boys     
Total sample        
Directly related to children   86.4 92.2   86.4  94.0 96.1   78.2
   Children's wedding    18.3 29.8   22.0  34.0 37.4   33.0
   Children's education    75.9 79.2   75.7  82.1 80.4   52.0
   Bequest to children    12.5 11.9   10.2  8.9 6.8   13.8
                 
Not directly related to children    69.6 59.2   72.3  56.0 55.9   69.5
   To build a house    19.7 20.2   20.3  24.3 26.7   18.3
   Retirement    45.5 37.3   45.8  27.9 22.8   47
   Medical expenses    14.2 6.1   14.7  7.5 8.5   18.9
                 
Others   8.7 7.1   2.3  8.2 11.7     9.5




Table 2: Material Wealth and Marital Status:  
Which Families Are More Likely to Have an Unmarried Adult Child? 
      Rural sample        Urban Sample    
  Logit  Multinominal logit  Logit  Multinominal logit 
    Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter 
Housing wealth  -0.41** 0.19 -0.41** 0.17 -0.39* 0.33 -0.38*    0.27 
  (0.19) (0.43) (0.19) (0.42) (0.21) (0.37) (0.21) (0.35) 
Per capita  income   0.25** 0.17 0.25** 0.18 0.33** 0.17 0.30** 0.16 
(log)  (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) 
Household size  0.10** 0.19** 0.10** 0.19** 0.43** 0.58** 0.45** 0.66** 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Household head age  0.11** 0.05 0.11** 0.05    0.18** 0.15** 0.18** 0.16** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Household head gender (Female =1)   -0.7  -1.05 -0.69 -1.05  0.61** 0.10 0.61** 0.18 
  (0.47) (1.05) (0.47) (1.05) (0.17) (0.25) (0.17) (0.24) 
Household head year of   0.01 0.10** 0.01 0.10**  -0.05* 0.08** -0.05*    0.08** 
Schooling  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Household head   0.21 0.55 0.21 0.53 0.14 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 
as a minority  (0.23) (0.40) (0.22) (0.40) (0.33) (0.49) (0.33) (0.49) 
Poor health  0.19 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.13 
   (0.19) (0.33) (0.19) (0.33) (0.20) (0.29) (0.20) (0.29) 
AIC 687.4  -1954.7  2080.1  811.4  -115.1  1756.1 
N 2575  2423  2640  1621  1525  1712 
Note: We restrict the sample to households who heads are between 50 and 60 years old. For the 
Logit regressions, the dependent variable is defined as 1 if a family has an unmarried son (or 
daughter) between the ages of 25-35; zero otherwise (all similar households without an adult 
child at home). For the multinomial logit regressions, we define the dependent variable as 1 for 
having an unmarried adult son, 2 for having an unmarried daughter, and zero otherwise (all 
similar households without an adult child at home).  Columns 3-4 (or Columns 7-8) represent a 
single regression. The variable “housing wealth” in the rural sample is a dummy if the family 
house is made of concrete, bricks, or stones (as opposed to mud or other inferior material); it is a 
dummy in the urban sample if the family owns an apartment/house (as opposed to rent one). The 
data are from the Chinese Household Income Project (2002). The symbols * and ** stand for 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 39 
 
Table 3: Wealth and Wedding in Rural Guizhou Province, China 
   Household head age (45-65)  Whole sample 
   Wedding for sonWedding for daughterWedding for son Wedding for daughter
House  value  (log)  0.034** 0.019 0.022** 0.009 
  (0.018) (0.275) (0.010) (0.350) 
Household income (log)  0.013  0.059**  0.021  0.030*   
  (0.57) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) 
Household  size  0.001 -0.01 0.003 -0.01 
  (0.93) (0.70) (0.67) (0.17) 
Household head age  0.009*  0.003  0.000  0.000 
  (0.06) (0.64) (0.70) (0.95) 
Household head gender (Female =1)  -0.034  -0.138  -0.048  -0.063 
  (0.63) (0.10) (0.27) (0.30) 
Household head year of schooling  0.013  0.043**  0.00  0.046*** 
  (0.44) (0.03) (0.74)  0.00   
Household head as a minority  -0.354***  -0.360***  -0.373***  -0.386*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adj. R-squared  0.273  0.25  0.267  0.238 
AIC  126.1 228.7 389.4 651.8 
N  225 225 664 664 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on a household survey in Guizhou Province designed by one of 
the authors and conducted by IFPRI in 2007. The survey asked about weddings in the period 
1996-2006. Columns 1 and 3 are for families with at least a son; Columns 2 and 4 are all families 
with at least a daughter.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols * and ** stand 
for significant level at 10% and 5%, respectively. 40 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Household Savings in 2002 
   Household type  Mean  Median  Max  Min 
Standard  
deviation N 
Rural                      
  One son  0.393  0.394  2.462  -2.986  0.625  580 
  One daughter  0.318  0.353  1.812  -3.559  0.626  326 
  All families  0.316  0.316  2.846  -5.026  0.582  9199 
Urban           
  One son  0.312  0.306  1.849  -1.816  0.333  769 
  One daughter  0.302  0.308  2.153  -1.299  0.356  766 
   All families  0.304  0.286  2.308  -2.432  0.378  6835 
Note: The savings rate is defined as log(income/consumption). The data comes from the Chinese Household Income Project (2002), available from 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/21741.xml. To maximize comparability, we restrict the sample to nuclear households with both parents still alive, 




Table 5: Rural Household Savings by Three-person Households with a Child in 2002  
   Full sample 
 
 
Sub-sample that removes the following potential outliers 
 
Income or expenditure  Bottom and top 5% savers  Bottom and top 5% savers  
<2000 yuans    & no explicit marriage status for child 
   Son   Daughter  Son  Daughter  Son  Daughter  Son  Daughter 
Local sex ratio (county level)  1.34** -0.17 1.38** -0.18 1.10** -0.23  1.20**  -0.32 
  (0.52) (0.55) (0.51) (0.54) (0.44) (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.44) 
Per capita income (log)  2.88** 2.49** 2.60** 2.76** 1.82** 2.44**  1.52**  3.10** 
  (0.63) (0.45) (0.91) (0.80) (0.56) (0.72)  (0.56)  (0.59) 
Per capita income squared (log)  -0.15** -0.12** -0.13** -0.14** -0.09** -0.13**  -0.07**  -0.17** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Child aged 5-9  0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.05  0.00  -0.06 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Child aged 10-14  -0.07 -0.14 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11  -0.02  -0.12 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Child aged 15-19  -0.23* -0.20*  -0.23** -0.08 -0.20** -0.08  -0.19**  -0.08 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10) 
Household head age  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  0.00    (0.00) 
Household head gender (Female =1)  -0.06 -0.36* -0.05 -0.36* -0.09  -0.10  -0.12  -0.09 
  (0.14) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Household head year of schooling  0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.02*  -0.01  -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household head as a minority  -0.15** -0.22** -0.14** -0.17**  -0.04  -0.11*  -0.05  -0.10 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Poor health  0.03 -0.72* 0.06  -0.72**  -0.04  -0.17**  -0.03  -0.02 
  (0.12) (0.37) (0.12) (0.37) (0.11) (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.16) 
Gini at the county level  -1.01** -0.40 -1.16** -0.33 -0.88** -0.53  -0.71**  -0.38 
  (0.45) (0.44) (0.40) (0.40) (0.34) (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Adj. R-squared  0.30 0.54 0.27 0.36 0.20 0.30  0.20  0.29 
AIC  906  376.4 836.3 329.8 466.5 171.2  393.5  157.2 
N  580 326 564 315 522 292  489  269 
Note: (1) The savings rate is defined as log(income/consumption). (2) To maximize comparability, we restrict the sample to those 
three-person nuclear families with both parents still alive, mother age younger than 40, and one child. For the first six regressions, a 
family member is defined as a child if younger than 20 years old, while for the last two columns, those unmarried and registered as a 
child of household head are counted as children. (3) “Poor health” is a dummy that takes the value of one if a household has at least 
one member with disability or extreme bad health. (4) The sex ratio at the county level is calculated by the authors for the age cohort 
of 0-9 from China Population Census 1990 (who became 12-21 in 2002). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *, and ** denote 




Table 6: Robust Checks - Rural Household-Level Savings  






Subsample that removes the following potential outliers 
 
  Income or expenditure  
< 2000 yuan 
Bottom and top 1% 
savers 
Bottom and top 5% savers  Bottom and top 5% savers 
& no explicit marriage 
status for child    
   Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter 
                
Mother age younger than 45 (nuclear family)                 
  OLS  1.29***  -0.13  1.32***  -0.31  1.03**  -0.19  1.32***  -0.32  1.07***  -0.58 
 (0.46)  (0.60)  (0.46)  (0.58)  (0.42)  (0.56) (0.39) (0.48) (0.41) (0.48) 
                
  Median regression  1.18**  0.07  0.97*  0.34 0.95** 0.07 1.09***  -0.36 1.20** -0.26 
 (0.52)  (0.46)  (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.41)  (0.41) (0.36) (0.31) (0.49) (0.63) 
                 
  Number of observations  705   387   688   372   689   379   633   347   634   321  
                 
Household head age younger than 45 (extended family)                 
  OLS  0.99**  0.19  0.96**  0.15  0.85** 0.21 1.19***  -0.01  1.30*** 0.23 
 (0.39)  (0.47)  (0.39)  (0.47)  (0.36)  (0.44) (0.32) (0.39) (0.34) (0.38) 
                
  Median regression  1.10***  0.19  1.00**  0.16 1.00*** 0.27  1.14*** 0.26 1.15*** 0.21 
 (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.42) (0.34) (0.50) (0.35) (0.58) 
                
  Number of observations  1125  639  1099  617  1101  625  1011  575  933  562 
Note: The nuclear family refers to households with two parents and one single child. The extended family sample includes all those 
households with one single child no matter. Therefore, the household size for extended family may be larger than three. In the 
regression for the extended family sample, we include an additional variable to control for household size. To maximize comparability, 
we restrict the sample to those three-person nuclear families with both parents still alive, mother age younger than 40, and one child. 
For the first six regressions, a family member is defined as a child if younger than 20 years old, while for the last two columns, those 





Table 7: Pooled Sample - Rural Household-Level Savings in 2002 
   All families with one child  All nuclear families with one child 
   OLS  Median  OLS  Median 
Local sex ratio (county level)  -0.45 -0.43  -0.03  -0.12 
  (0.36) (0.35)  (0.56)  (0.51) 
Sex ratio * dummy for son  1.26** 1.15**  1.39*  1.21*   
  (0.48) (0.46)  (0.77)  (0.65) 
Son  -1.39** -1.25**  -1.53*  -1.33*   
  (0.53) (0.50)  (0.83)  (0.70) 
Per capita income (log)  2.37** 2.36**  2.59**  2.19** 
  (0.20) (0.15)  (0.38)  (0.19) 
Per capita income squared (log)  -0.12** -0.12**  -0.13**  -0.11** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Child aged 5-9  0.04 -0.01  -0.02  -0.07 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
Child aged 10-14  -0.06 -0.04  -0.1  -0.10*   
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05) 
Child aged 15-19  -0.12** -0.14**  -0.22**  -0.21** 
  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
Household size  0.06**  0.06**                   
  (0.01)  (0.01)                   
Household head age  0.00* 0.00  -0.01 -0.01**   
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Household head gender (Female =1)  -0.09* -0.10**  -0.20  -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Household head year of schooling  -0.01** -0.02**  -0.01  -0.01*   
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household head as a minority  -0.13** -0.09**  -0.18**  -0.23** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Poor health  -0.12** -0.13**  -0.15  -0.12 
  (0.06) (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Gini at the county level  -0.69** -0.74**  -0.81**  -0.92** 
   (0.19) (0.18)  (0.32)  (0.26) 
N  2616 2616  906  906 




Table 8: Rural Household Savings (Interacting Income Quartiles and Local Sex Ratios) 
   Before removing outliers 
 After excluding top/bottom 5% 
observations 
 Son  Daughter  Son  Daughter 
   1  2  5  6 
Quartile 1*sex ratio  0.90 -0.32  0.82*  -0.18 
  (0.56) (0.56)  (0.49)  (0.45) 
Quartile 2*sex ratio  1.02* -0.27  0.94*  -0.22 
  (0.55) (0.56)  (0.49)  (0.45) 
Quartile 3*sex ratio  1.13** -0.21  1.02**  -0.13 
  (0.55) (0.55)  (0.49)  (0.46) 
Quartile 4*sex ratio  1.19** -0.15  1.10**  -0.09 
  (0.54) (0.55)  (0.47)  (0.45) 
Per capita income (log)  2.35*** 2.56***  0.84  2.92*** 
  (0.54) (0.46)  (0.80)  (0.55) 
Per capita income (log) 
squared 
-0.12*** -0.13***  -0.04  -0.17*** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Household head age  0.01 -0.02  0.00  -0.07 
  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Child aged 5-9  -0.06 -0.13  0.00  -0.12 
  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Child aged 10-14  -0.23** -0.15  -0.14*  -0.05 
  (0.11) (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.11) 
Child aged 15-19  0.00 0.00  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Household head gender 
(Female =1) 
-0.06 -0.36*  -0.10  -0.11 
  (0.16) (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.14) 
Household head year of 
schooling 
0.01 -0.02**  0.00  -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Household head as a 
minority 
-0.17** -0.21**  -0.06  -0.08 
  (0.07) (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Poor health  0.07 -0.09  0.08  -0.03 
  (0.11) (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Gini at the county level  -1.00** -0.32  -0.79**  -0.53 
  (0.46) (0.47)  (0.36)  (0.35) 
Adj. R-squared  0.31  0.54  0.21  0.33 
AIC 898.6  383.6  425  142.1 





Table 9: Urban Household-level Savings by Three-person Households in 2002 
               Subsamples that remove the following outliers 
 Full sample 
Income or expenditure 
 < 3000 yuan 
Bottom and top  
5% 
Bottom and top  
5% & 
      no explicit marriage status 
  
Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter 
Local sex ratio (county level) 
1.54**  1.85**  1.16** 1.07** 1.31**  0.65**  0.98** 0.47 
 
(0.29) (0.33) (0.30)  (0.37)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.32) 
Per capita income (log) 
0.10 0.69 1.60  0.80  -0.06  0.46  1.38**  0.37 
 
(0.73) (0.53) (1.02)  (0.85)  (0.63)  (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.50) 
Per capita income squared (log) 
0.00 -0.03 -0.07  -0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.07**  -0.01 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Child aged 5-9 
-0.01 -0.05 0.01  -0.04  0.00  -0.05*  -0.01  0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Child aged 10-14 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.04 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Child aged 15-19 
-0.19** -0.17** -0.17**  -0.14*  -0.16**  -0.05  -0.11  -0.01 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Household head age 
0.00  0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Household head gender (Female =1) 
-0.05** -0.08**  -0.01  -0.05*  -0.05**  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Household head year of schooling 
-0.01** -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01*  -0.01**  0.00  -0.01**  0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Household head as a minority 
0.00  0.06  0.01  0.05  -0.01 0.04 -0.03  -0.07 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Poor health 
-0.06 -0.03 -0.01  -0.04  -0.04  0.01  -0.02  0.00 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Own a house 
0.09**  0.03  0.09** 0.03 0.07**  0.05*  0.09**  0.08** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Gini at the county level 
0.35  -0.05  0.69**  -0.21  0.14 -0.18 0.41  -0.33 
  
(0.30) (0.34) (0.29)  (0.37)  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.30) 
Adj. R-squared  0.11  0.14  0.16  0.14  0.1  0.06  0.08  0.07 
AIC 418  489.7  235.9  310.9  222.8  -2.7  -78.7  -21.8 
N  769 766 604  605  753  688  384  399 
Note: (1) The savings rate is defined as log(income/consumption). (2) To maximize comparability, we restrict the sample to 
those three-person nuclear families with both parents still alive, mother age younger than 40, and one child. For the first eight 
regressions, a family member is defined as a child if younger than 20 years old, while for the last two columns, those 
unmarried and registered as a child of household head are counted as children. (3) “Poor health” is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if a household has at least one member with disability or extreme bad health. (4) The sex ratio at the county 
level is calculated by the authors for the age cohort of 0-9 from China Population Census 1990 (who became 12-21 in 2002). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *, and ** denote significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Additional 
controls include: without public insurance, with a family laid off, with a family member in SOE, experienced firm 




Table 10: Robust Checks - Urban Household Savings 
    
Full sample 
Sub-sample that drops the following observations 
  Income or expenditure 
<3000 yuans 
Bottom and top 1% 
savers 
Bottom and top 5% 
savers 
Bottom and top 5% 
savers & no explicit 
marriage status for child 
   Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter  Son   Daughter 
                
Mother age younger than 45 (nuclear family)                 
  OLS  1.32***  1.53***  1.32***  0.98***  1.31***  1.18***  0.65***  0.59***  0.84***  0.35 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) 
                
  Median regression  0.89***  1.31***  0.75**  0.56**  1.00***  1.26***  0.70**  0.78***  0.90**  0.37 
  (0.30) (0.27) (0.34) (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.32)  (0.24) (0.37) (0.36) 
 
                 
  Number of observations  1188   1145   971   931   1164   1121   1068   1029   675   657  
                   
Mother age younger than 45 (extended family)                 
  OLS  1.28***  1.51***  0.96***  1.51***  1.16***  1.21***  0.61***  0.57***  0.76***  0.50** 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) 
                
  Median regression  0.88***  1.20***  0.67***  0.57**  0.89***  1.10***  0.56**  0.67***  0.72*  0.44 
  (0.29) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.22) (0.42) (0.37) 
                
  Number of observations  1347  1294  1090  1041  1319  1268  1211  1164  761  744 
Note: To maximize comparability, we restrict the sample to those three-person nuclear families with 
both parents still alive, mother age younger than 40, and one child. For the first eight regressions, a 
family member is defined as a child if younger than 20 years old, while for the last two columns, those 
unmarried and registered as a child of household head are counted as children. Only the coefficients for 




Table 11: Sex Ratios and Housing Values 
LHS Variable = Per capita living space or average housing value (in log) at the county or city level in 2000 
      County              City       
    Space Space Value Value  Space Space Value Value 
Sex ratio for age cohort 10-19 in 2000  0.22**  -0.02  0.54**  0.37**    0.70**  0.37**  1.46**  0.74** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.16) (0.13)  (0.16) (0.14) (0.32) (0.23) 
Per capita GDP in 1999 (log)  -0.06  -0.04  -1.32** -0.65**   -0.35  -0.30 -3.24**  -1.78** 
  (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21)  (0.24) (0.22) (0.46) (0.37) 
Per capita GDP in 1999 (log) squared  0.01  0.01  0.11**  0.06**    0.03*  0.02  0.21**  0.11** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   -0.014 -0.013 -0.026 -0.021 
Household size (log)  -0.43**  -0.44**  0.70**  1.00**    1.50**  1.55**  0.77**  0.28*   
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.21)  (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) 
Share of population aged 0-19  -4.35**  -2.57**  -4.01** -4.11**  -3.66** -2.42** -1.85**  -0.30 
  (0.32) (0.29) (0.68) (0.70)  (0.33) -0.314 (0.65) -0.567 
Share of population aged 20-59   -2.93**  -1.32**  -3.30** -2.52**  -2.89** -1.05** -2.28**  -0.28 
  (0.30) (0.28) (0.54) (0.57)  (0.37) (0.33) (0.68) (0.56) 
Province  fixed  effect   yes  yes     yes  yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.41 0.64 0.33 0.57    0.39 0.69 0.43 0.70 
AIC 31.73  -958.00  2584.46  1704.71    -325.82  -718.74  404.35  48.26 
N  2088 2088 2088 2088      671  671  671  671 
Note: Per capita living space and housing value are from China Population Census 2000. The resident bank deposit and per capita GDP are from various issues of China County Social and Economics 
Statistical Yearbooks. The sex ratio for age cohort 0-9 is inferred from the 1990 census (who became age cohort 10-19 in 2000). The share of population aged 0-19 and 25-59 are calculated from the 




Table 12: Summary Statistics for Key Variables in Provincial Panel Regressions 
   China  Province 
Variables     Mean  Median  Std 
1980         
Savings rate  0.159  0.137  0.141  0.049 
Sex ratio for age cohort 7‐21  1.059  1.059  1.059  0.038 
Sex ratio at birth in 1982  1.083  1.048  1.070  0.124 
Per capita income (log)  5.331  5.444  5.362  0.223 
Share of SOEs in total employment  0.189  0.190  0.142  0.103 
1990         
Savings rate  0.162  0.147  0.150  0.048 
Sex ratio for age cohort 7‐21  1.045  1.045  1.047  0.057 
Sex ratio at birth  1.147  1.114  1.117  0.029 
Per capita income (log)  6.600  6.715  6.684  0.252 
Share of SOEs in total employment  0.162  0.185  0.150  0.100 
2000         
Savings rate  0.262  0.274  0.258  0.076 
Sex ratio for age cohort 7‐21  1.079  1.080  1.082  0.048 
Sex ratio at birth  1.199  1.180  1.160  0.080 
Per capita income (log)  7.868  8.087  8.046  0.343 
Share of SOEs in total employment  0.114  0.131  0.116  0.063 
Share of labor force enrolled in social security  0.191  0.174  0.144  0.107 
2007         
Savings rate  0.302  0.310  0.304  0.056 
Sex ratio for age cohort 7‐21  1.136  1.136  1.130  0.041 
Sex ratio at birth in 2005  1.200  1.200  1.200  0.077 
Per capita income (log)  8.743  9.028  8.898  0.337 
Share of SOEs in total employment  0.082  0.086  0.070  0.035 
Share of labor force enrolled in social security  0.256  0.295  0.257  0.174 
Note: Saving rate is defined as log(income/consumption). The sex ratios for age cohort 7-21 are inferred from the 2000 population census. For example, the cohort 7-21 in 2007 was the cohort 0-14 in 
the 2000 census, since the two groups should theoretically be the same. The sex ratios at birth in 1982, 1990 and 2000 at the national level are published figures from China Population Censuses. 
Since the disaggregate sex ratios at birth in 1980 and 1990 are not public available, we use sex ratios for cohort 20 and 10 years old, respectively from the 2000 census to approximate them . The sex 
ratios at birth in 2005 are from Zhu, Lu and Hesketh (2009) which are calculated based on China 1% Population Survey 2005.  Zhu, Lu, and Hesketh report sex ratios at birth for urban, town and rural 




Table 13: Top and Bottom 5 Provinces in Terms of Sex Ratios at Birth 
 
   Highest        Lowest    
   Ratios       Ratios    
1982          
1 Anhui    1.11    Tibet    0.99 
2 Guangxi  1.11    Qinghai    1.02 
3 Guangdong  1.1    Xinjiang  1.04 
4 Henan    1.1    Yunnan    1.04 
5 Shandong    1.09    Ningxia 1.05 
1990          
1 Guangxi  1.22    Guizhou   1 
2 Zhejiang    1.18    Tibet    1 
3 Henan    1.17   Xinjiang  1.04 
4  Shandong   1.16    Qinghai   1.04 
5 Jiangsu    1.15   Shanghai    1.05 
2000          
1 Hainan    1.37    Tibet    1.03 
2 Guangdong  1.31    Xinjiang  1.06 
3 Anhui    1.29   Guizhou    1.08 
4 Hubei    1.29   Ningxia  1.09 
5 Guangxi  1.27   
Inner 
Mongolia   1.09 
2005        
1   Jiangxi   1.37     Tibet   1.05 
2   Shaanxi   1.32     Liaoning   1.09 
3   Anhui   1.32     Jilin   1.09 
4   Hunan   1.28     Xinjiang   1.09 
5   Guizhou   1.28    
 
Heilongjiang   1.10 
 
Sources: Sex ratios in 1990 and 2000 are from China Population Censuses 1990 and 2000. The 1982 values are inferred from the 1990 census. The figures in 




Table 14: Sex Ratios and Savings Rates across Provinces - Panel Regression, 1980-2007  
LHS variable =     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (Y-C)/Y  
            
Sex ratio for age cohort 7-21    0.28**  0.58** 0.73** 0.28** 0.32** 0.24**       
    (0.05) (0.18) (0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)       
Sex ratio for age cohort 7-15                0.19**    0.17** 
           (0.04)    (0.04) 
Sex ratio for age cohort 16-21                  0.17**  0.14** 
            (0.04)  (0.04) 
Per capita income (log)    0.20**  0.29**  0.31** 0.20** 0.20** 0.19** 0.19** 0.20** 0.20** 
    (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Share of population aged 0-19    0.01  0.09  0.08  0  0.04  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  0.04 
    (0.06) (0.21) (0.21) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Share of population aged 20-59    -0.24**  0.22  0.27 -0.25**  -0.23* -0.26* -0.24*  -0.30** -0.2 
    (0.11) (0.43) (0.29) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Gini coefficient      -0.08         
      (0.25)         
Average birth rate for age cohort 7-21        0.04              
       (0.23)        
Life expectancy (log)         1.29        
        (0.97)       
Share of SOE employment            -0.10**  -0.03  -0.06* -0.03  -0.10** 
  in  total  labor  force         (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Share of labor force             -0.03*  -0.03*  -0.04*  -0.02  -0.03 
enrolled in social security             (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Growth rate from t-5 to t              -0.03*       
          ( 0 . 0 2 )      
Province fixed effects?    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects?    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted  R-squared      0.78 0.82 0.72 0.79 0.78  0.8  0.78 0.78 0.78 
AIC    -3324  -596  -457  -3270 -3326 -2840 -3311 -3296 -3322 
N      844 141 112 829 844 710 844 844 844 
Note: (a) Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
(b) * and ** denote statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 






Table 15: First Stage Regressions for Savings Rate at the Provincial Level 
LHS variable = Sex Ratio   R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
Penalty for violating family planning policy  0.010**    0.010**  0.010** 
   (% of local yearly income)  (0.002)     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Dummy for extra penalty for higher order births   0.008**  0.009**  0.003 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Share of local population exempted from birth quotas      -0.283**    -0.278** 
     (0.04)    (0.04) 
Per capita income (log)  -0.034** -0.034** -0.050** -0.035** -0.050** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Share of population aged 0-19  -0.286** -0.274** -0.158** -0.273** -0.156** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Share of population aged 20-59  -0.430** -0.396**  -0.240*  -0.421** -0.266** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Share of SOE employment  in total labor force   0.422** 0.384** 0.343** 0.416** 0.375** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Share of labor force enrolled in social security   0.007 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.017 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Province fixed effects?  Yes yes yes yes Yes 
Year fixed effects?  Yes yes yes Yes Yes 
                 
Adjusted R-squared  0.72 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.74 
AIC  -3795 -3777 -3839 -3799 -3862 
N  844 844 844 844 844 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Sex 




Table 16: 2SLS Regressions for Savings at the Provincial Level 














One financial  
penalty 
 











Per capita income (log)  0.21**  0.22**  0.23** 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Share of population aged 0-19  0.12  0.25*  0.28 
 (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.18) 
Share of population aged 20-59  -0.11  0.08  0.12 
 (0.18)  (0.28)  (0.32) 
Share of SOE employment    -0.21**  -0.40**  -0.43** 
    in total labor force   (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.20) 
Share of labor force enrolled  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
     in social security   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
      
Province fixed effects?  Yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed effects?  Yes  yes  yes 
      
Adjusted R-squared  0.77  0.71  0.69 
AIC -3224  -3020  -2965 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   0.03  0.00  0.00 
Hansen's J statistic for over identification   0.11  0.59   
N 844  844  844 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Sex 
ratios are inferred from the 2000 population census. The instruments used in the three regressions correspond to those presented in 




Table 17: Sex Ratios and Bank Deposits 























Sex ratio for age cohort 12-21 in 2002  2.54**  2.67**  1.20**  0.43*  0.40*   
(or change in the sex ratio in the last two columns)  (0.89)  (0.92)  (0.49)  (0.27)  (0.22) 
       
GDP/capita in 1999 (log)  0.62**  -1.72**  -1.52**  0.08**  0.08** 
(or change from 94 to 99 in last two columns)  (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.58)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 
GDP/capita in 1999 (log) squared    0.14**  0.12**              
    (0.03)  (0.04)              
 
Share of population aged 0-19  7.12**  7.21**  10.62**  1.12  0.97 
  (1.17) (1.17) (1.19) (0.75) (0.85) 
Share of population aged 20-59  17.56**  17.64**  22.77**  0.63  0.55 
  (1.25) (1.25) (1.21) (0.66) (0.73) 
          
Provincial fixed effects     yes    yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.38  0.39  0.485  0.02  0.08 
AIC  5576 5561 5255 2542 2441 
N  1972 1972 1972 1875 1875 
Note: The per capita residential bank deposit and per capita GDP are from China County Social 
and Economics Statistical Yearbooks (CNBS). For the first four regressions, the sex ratio is 
inferred from the age cohort 0-9 in the 1990 population census who aged to be 12-21 in 2002. 
The shares in population for age cohorts 0-19 and 20-59 are derived from the 2000 census. For 
the last two regressions, the sex ratio variable is defined as the change in sex ratio from age 
cohort 0-19 to age cohort 10-19 from the 1990 census, while the share of population variables 







Figure 1:  Sex Ratios and Saving Rates 
Note: The sex ratio is defined as the ratio at birth 20 years earlier; see the footnote to Table 12 for data source. The 
saving rate is defined as the ratio of (GDP-private and government consumptions) to total GDP, which is available 
from China Statistical Yearbook 2007. Both variables have been rescaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by 




Figure 2:  Time Profile of Household Savings Rate in relation to the Timing of a Wedding: 
Evidence from 18 Natural (3 Administrative) Villages in Guizhou Province 
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on surveys designed by one of the authors and conducted by IFPRI. 
 